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  1. #8776

    Re: World News Random, Random

    Cristina Fernandez (Kirschner) is running in a ticket for the vice presidency. They won the first run off (or something like that, Drop should correct me) and that simple fact cause a massive devaluation of the peso.
    The general population might be dumb enough to vote for her again, but the financial markets know what will happen once she returns to power.
    Missing winter...

  2. #8777

    Re: World News Random, Random

    Quote Originally Posted by Ti-Amie View Post
    Slate Money was very good this week. They got into BrexitShambles and what is going on in Argentina. The Kirchners are in power again?
    Quote Originally Posted by ponchi101 View Post
    Cristina Fernandez (Kirschner) is running in a ticket for the vice presidency. They won the first run off (or something like that, Drop should correct me) and that simple fact cause a massive devaluation of the peso.
    The general population might be dumb enough to vote for her again, but the financial markets know what will happen once she returns to power.
    They have a primary election and CFK's puppet won by 17pts, which of course added gasoline to an already burning country. The level of paranoia and uncertainty is staggering. People are taking their dollars out of the banks in fear that the dollar hemorrhage depletes the reserves and thus the banks have no more dollars to give the customers. Worse is the fear that once they have their dollars incarcerated, they´ll be forcefully turned into pesos like in the 2001 crisis.

    Security boxes in banks are in short supply and any errand there insumes a LONG time. And we still have a month of instability to go! Yay chaos!
    Meet again we do, old foe...

  3. #8778
    Everyday Warrior MJ2004's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2008

    World News Random, Random

    The piece on Amazon was also interesting. We get those deliveries from personal cars/vans. All year, not just at Christmas.
    Last edited by MJ2004; 09-09-2019 at 07:44 AM.

  4. #8779

    Re: World News Random, Random

    Alex Spence

    EXCL: I've been leaked a personal minute from Boris Johnson to cabinet ministers in which he says wants to turn the public http://GOV.UK site into a platform for "targeted and personalised" data to be gathered in the run-up to Brexit.
    Boris Johnson Secretly Asked For A Massive Amount Of User Data To Be Tracked. Dominic Cummings Said It’s “TOP PRIORITY”.
    Leaked documents show the prime minister’s chief adviser emailed senior officials instructing them: “We must get this stuff finalised ASAP.”

    Deena Smith

    Replying to @alexGspence
    I received email from the PM asking for donations after signing 2 petitions on Gov site. I've never signed up to receive emails from the the Conservatives in my life..

    Replying to
    @ICOnews and @BylineTimes
    We’d ask the 6m who surrendered data to sign the Revoke Art.50 petition, data now in the hands of
    @GOVUK, to be on their guard
    There is more stupidity than hydrogen in the universe, and it has a longer shelf life.”

    ― Frank Zappa

  5. #8780

    Re: World News Random, Random

    It's not really news, but I stumbled on this article and found it interesting. Likely a topic few if any of you have thought about, but perhaps of interest anyway...

    But you don’t look Turkish!”: The Changing Face of Turkish Immigration to Germany
    Gülay Türkmen 27 May 2019

    When I moved to Germany two and a half years ago to work as a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Göttingen, I considered it to be just another stop in my incessantly nomadic academic life. Little did I know that this adventure would force me to think about my national identity in a way none of my previous migration experiences had. I had left my native Turkey in 2007, to pursue a Ph.D. in sociology in the United States and had lived in the UK and the Netherlands before moving to Germany.

    Yet, it was only in Germany that I received the comment “but you don’t look Turkish!”[i] when I mentioned where I came from. Soon enough, my mind was occupied with what it means to “look Turkish.”

    With this question in mind, in 2018 I saw online a photo-performance series by the Berlin-based Turkish artist Işıl Eğrikavuk. Intrigued by the frequency with which she has been getting the same comment since she moved to Germany in September 2017, Eğrikavuk posed for a series of photos carrying a placard that read “but you don’t look Turkish!” She explains the background to this project as follows: “It is very interesting to be Turkish in Germany due to the long-existing Gastarbeiter community here and due to the strong stereotypes in peoples’ minds… One thing that I hear a lot is that I don’t look or act like a Turkish person. This makes me ponder a lot: ‘What is a Turkish woman in your mind?’ It is strange when people stereotype just by looking at your origins”.

    Eğrikavuk’s project allowed me to see I was not alone in my endeavor to navigate the established perception of Turkishness in Germany. This prompted me to dig deeper into this topic and conduct interviews with highly-skilled immigrants from Turkey who had arrived in Germany in the last 10 years.

    What reactions do they get when they introduce themselves as Turkish/coming from Turkey? Do they ever hear the infamous “but you don’t look Turkish”? If so, how do they respond to this? If not, what other remarks do they get? Based on the 15 interviews I have conducted so far in Goettingen, Dusseldorf, Cologne, Berlin, Bielefeld, Mainz, Giessen, and Munich, I can easily say “but you don’t look Turkish” is not just about ethnicity or national identity.

    It is about socio-economic status. It is about religion. It is about rural/urban background. Moreover, it is not only a question of German perceptions of Turkish people. It also reflects the self-perception of Turkish people and the fault lines that have historically divided the heterogeneous Turkish society.

    Innocent and simple as it may sound, it is the embodiment of existing judgments about the Turkish diaspora in Germany, and unpacking the multi-level connotations it carries requires an examination of the complex history of Turkish immigration to Germany.

    The history of immigration from Turkey to Germany

    According to Germany’s Federal Office for Statistics, around 2.7 million people with Turkish roots were living in Germany in 2017—constituting 3.4% of the overall population of 81.7 million. The origins of Turkish immigration go back to 1961, when Turkey and then West Germany signed a bilateral labor recruitment agreement.

    Between 1968 and 1973, 80% of the 525,000 workers who left Turkey arrived in West Germany as “guest workers” (Gastarbeiter). As a result, the Turkish population in the country rose from 6,700 in 1961 to 605,000 in 1973. Initially, workers could not bring their families with them, and the recruitment agreement limited their period of residence to a maximum of two years. In 1964 the two-year limitation was removed and family unifications were allowed.

    By 1974, 20% of Turkish immigrants in Germany were non-working spouses, while another 20% were children. Despite the total halt on foreign labor recruitment in 1973, the number of Turkish immigrants in Germany kept growing.

    A 1963 survey conducted in West Germany by the State Planning Organization showed that, in comparison to later arrivals, Turkish immigrants arriving in early ‘60s were better educated: 13% had completed middle school, and 15% vocational schools, while 49% were primary school graduates.

    This first group of migrants was also rather urban (only 17% had a rural background[ii]) and hailed from all over Turkey, including the more developed western and northwestern cities. Yet, this was the exception rather than the norm. Things changed rapidly in the second half of the 1960s.

    As German manufacturing needed semi-skilled or unskilled laborers for jobs on assembly lines and in shift work, they mainly recruited Turkish workers with low education levels; 73% of first-generation Turkish immigrants in European countries had only elementary school degrees.

    In addition, in the early 1970s, the Turkish Employment Service started prioritizing applications from developing and under-developed provinces, which led to an influx of immigrants from rural Turkish towns.

    In the 1980s and 1990s, as a result of the 1980 military coup and the intensifying Kurdish conflict, the migration pattern took a different turn. Many asylum seekers and refugees from Turkey—mostly Kurds and Alevis, but also leftists fleeing the post-1980 crackdown—started arriving in Germany.

    While this new group was on average far more skilled and educated, many were locked out of the labor market due to a lack of legal status or qualifications unrecognized by employers. Most ended up working in undocumented jobs. Thus, as immigrants from Turkey in Germany grew more socially, politically, and ethnically diverse, their overall socio-economic status shifted little.

    Despite upward inter-generational mobility, data from the German Socio-Economic Panel covering a period from 1985 to 2014, show that full-time employed immigrants from Turkey between the ages 25 and 64 had a considerably lower level of educational attainment than their German counterparts.[iii]

    This trend is now poised to change as a “new wave” of Turkish immigrants is taking root in Germany. According to the German Ministry of Immigration, 47,750 people immigrated from Turkey in 2017—a 15% increase from 2016. The number of asylum seekers skyrocketed following the coup attempt of July 2016; the number of family reunifications has also increased.

    This “new wave” of immigrants is quite diverse: Gülenists (followers of Fethullah Gülen, the US-based Turkish cleric, believed to have masterminded the failed coup attempt in 2016, after his fall-out with Erdoğan), white-collar professionals who no longer see a future for themselves in Turkey, students, leftist oppositional figures, Kurdish political actors, persecuted academics, and exiled intellectuals, among others.

    In 2018, 48% of the 10,600 Turkish nationals who applied for asylum in Germany reported having university degrees. Even in 2012 and 2015, recent immigrants from Turkey had higher levels of educational attainment than their earlier counterparts. Originating from big cities like Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara, they are also more urban.

    Hence, the socio-economic profile of migrants from Turkey has changed drastically in recent years. It is exactly this discrepancy that gives birth to the comment, “But you don’t look Turkish!” Because newly arriving immigrants do not fit the existing perception of Turkishness in Germany, most end up having to explain how they, too, are Turkish/from Turkey. The exhaustion caused by this process is the most commonly cited feeling among my interviewees.

    “It is tiring to have to constantly explain yourself”

    “I understand where this comment originates from”, says Duygu,[iv] an anthropologist who came to Germany two years ago, after being dismissed from her position at a Turkish university for having signed the Academics for Peace Petition. “Yet, I do not wear my social scientist hat 24/7. Usually, if I start the conversation in English, they think I am Spanish or French. When I say I am from Turkey, their face darkens and they take a step back.

    When the conversation gets interrupted like that, I get frustrated. I think to myself ‘what have I done to you? Why do you punish me just because I come from Turkey?’”

    Damla, a marketing specialist living in Germany since 2010, shares the frustration:

    “When I receive this comment, I immediately give details: ‘I was not born here, I have come here for work, I am different from the Turkish people living here’. Yet, living in a country where I am not comfortable declaring ‘I am Turkish’ disturbs me in a weird way. I did not experience this in the United States. In Germany, I constantly have to clarify that ‘I am not one of those Turks’”.

    Esin, an academic who has been in Germany since 2017, underlines the strength of racism and prevalent prejudices in Germany: “When I first came to Germany I used to get quite angry at this comment, especially if it was followed by questions about Turkey’s EU membership or about ‘why I don’t wear a headscarf’. In time, it has become less annoying.

    I know racism is strong in this country, so I just do not care anymore. Still, having to explain myself at the beginning of a conversation tires me. Also, because most people use ‘but you don’t look Turkish’ as a ‘compliment’ I sometimes find myself defending things about Turkey which I would otherwise not defend.”

    This weariness is particularly pronounced in narratives about diet and perceived religiosity. Demir, an electrical engineer who moved to Germany four years ago, says:

    “I cannot drink beer and wine, I drink only whiskey. Hence, when I have dinner with my German colleagues they immediately ask if I am not drinking alcohol because I am Turkish. ‘No,’ I say, ‘I drink whiskey, just not at dinner time.’ The same with pork. Every time I avoid it at company dinners I feel the urge to explain that it is not because of religious reasons, but because I simply do not like the taste. Having to explain all these details becomes tiring at times”.

    “I sometimes feel scared to ‘confess’ I do not eat pork thinking it might put me in the same category as the Turks living here”, says Damla. Zerrin, an academic who has lived in Germany for five years, defines this as “self-orientalism”: “When I was pregnant and I could not drink alcohol, I felt the urge to explain why, even if they did not ask. Come to think about it, it is self-orientalism”.

    “We are not like them!”: Reproducing stereotypes

    Some interviewees are less reactionary. Underlining how different they are from the Turkish diaspora in Germany, they think it is only understandable that some Germans would think they are not Turkish. Merve, a chemist who came to Germany for her doctoral studies, says:

    “When I first received this comment, I was perplexed; I asked the person why he thinks I am not Turkish, he said ‘because you don’t wear a headscarf.’ Over time, I have decided we need to empathize with Germans, they have been living with foreigners for years and not every Turk in Germany is educated and modern like us.

    Nowadays, when I go back to Turkey I am disturbed by the number of Arabs and Kurds in my hometown. Then I put myself in Germans’ shoes and ask myself ‘would I want my child to attend school with Syrian children?’”

    Begüm, a mechanical engineer who moved to Germany five years ago “after the governmental reaction to the Gezi uprising”, reiterates the distinction between the newcomers and the established diaspora. She draws attention to how it is reproduced even by the latter: “I usually do not get angry when I hear this comment.

    I explain how different the Turks here in Germany are, especially in terms of educational background. Also, I come from Istanbul, and people know Istanbulites are more modern. Plus, I have these conversations also with Turks born and raised here. For example, they are surprised I am fluent in English. Especially the younger generation here does not know Turks like us exist in Turkey”.

    Some interviewees are concerned about reproducing this distinction. Orhan, an industrial engineer who left Turkey due to “political and socio-economic reasons” 18 months ago, says:

    “I find this comment rather normal. In the beginning, I even felt proud to receive it, thinking ‘it’s good I don’t look like the Turks here.’ Over time, I have started explaining in detail: ‘Look,’ I say, ‘half of the Turkish population is like me, and the other half is like the Turks in Germany.’ Yet, I am also unhappy about accepting and reproducing this distinction”.

    Gamze, a marketing specialist who left Turkey because of the “inhumane working hours”, says such comments are intersectional with class. She does not receive them in business life, where “people are used to meeting with expats”.

    She does, however, receive them in more public settings: “Just a few days ago, at a hospital, I was told I don’t look Turkish. I explained to the nurse that Turkey is a diverse country with varying skin colors. At other times, I am not that patient, and I get angry about being judged by where I come from. Yet, I think that we—Turkish people—are much more judgmental than Germans who are quite open-minded.

    By declaring ‘we are not like the Turks here’, we are othering those Turks. I do not like this at all, but I do it too. For example, when someone cuts a queue, or breaches traffic rules, my husband and I immediately think ‘this person must be Turkish.’

    Boundaries of Turkishness in Germany and in Turkey

    My interviewees frequently note how unhelpful phenotypical categorization is when it comes to defining “Turkishness.” “As a blond person I get this comment a lot”, says Bora, who works in management consultancy. “I explain that Turkey is ethnically diverse, home to people with different phenotypic features”.

    When I ask if he thinks he looks Turkish, he continues: “I don’t think it is possible to define Turkishness. Turkey might not be as diverse as, say, Brazil and the average Turkish person might have darker hair but still, I think I look quite Turkish”. Similarly, Duygu, who is ethnically Tatar, says that no particular image comes to her mind when she thinks of a Turkish person. “It is such a mixed country. Because it is that mixed, it might as well be that I look Turkish.”

    Başak, an academic living in Germany since 2012, summarizes the issue with the following anecdote: “I do online dating from time to time. When my dates ask me the dreaded origins question, I flirtatiously ask them to guess. They typically list Mediterranean countries all the way up to Greece and stop there in confusion (some move on to Latin America). I guess they think ‘a Turkish woman—by default Muslim, in their eyes—cannot be doing something the obvious purpose of which is casual sex”.

    Turkey is indeed phenotypically diverse, making it difficult to come up with a stereotypical “Turkish” look. Yet, when it comes to demographic details, “but you don’t look Turkish” might have a hint of truth to it.

    Highly-skilled immigrants from Turkey, at least the ones I have interviewed so far, differ considerably from the majority of the Turkish population, not only in Germany but also in Turkey, in their educational attainment, religious belief/practices, and lifestyle. According to a nationally representative survey conducted in 2018 by the Istanbul-based research company KONDA across 36 Turkish cities with 5,793 respondents, 16% of the respondents were university graduates.

    Similarly, only 2% of mothers and 5% of fathers had university degrees. My interviewees, on the other hand, all have university degrees, and their parents are mostly university graduates (except for a few who are high school graduates). One can observe the same pattern in religious beliefs. Only 3% of the respondents defined themselves as atheists, while 2% were non-believers. In contrast, more than half of my interviewees are atheists or non-believers, while the rest are “non-practicing believers”.

    Lastly, while 45% of the respondents defined themselves as traditional conservatives, and 25% as religious conservatives, only 29% consider themselves “modern”, a category to which all my interviewees would belong.

    As such, the academics and white-collar professionals I have interviewed are outliers when it comes to socio-economic status and lifestyle. This explains why some Germans think they don’t look Turkish. It also explains why almost all feel estranged from Turkey.

    However, national identity is not only about phenotypic features and demographic details. Multi-layered and constantly negotiated, it is also about emotions, language, cultural codes, and familiarity. That is why, despite underlining their alienation from Turkey, highly-skilled Turkish immigrants have difficulty in developing a sense of belonging to Germany and get perplexed when told they don’t look Turkish. As Demir puts it, they “are just black sheep. [They] don’t fit anywhere.”

    Gülay Türkmen is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Göttingen’s Department of Sociology. Her work examines how certain historical, cultural and political developments inform questions of belonging and identity-formation in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies. She has published in several academic outlets including the Annual Review of Sociology, Qualitative Sociology, Sociological Quarterly, and Nations and Nationalism.
    Roger forever

  6. #8781

    Re: World News Random, Random

    Ben Rhodes

    It would be good if the US had a national security advisor and a confirmed DNI. Chaos at home during a crisis of Trump’s making bc of blank check for Saudis and pulling out of JCPOA.

    Juliette Kayyem
    3 things about the attack on a Saudi oil facility stand out:
    1) The sophistication — the Houthi couldn't have done this on their own
    2) The geopolitical — Yemen proxy war has arrived in Saudi Arabia
    3) Oil output — impact won't be overnight, but risk profile has increased.
    There is more stupidity than hydrogen in the universe, and it has a longer shelf life.”

    ― Frank Zappa

  7. #8782

    Re: World News Random, Random

    Why Iran is getting the blame for an attack on Saudi Arabia claimed by Yemen’s Houthis

    Adam Taylor
    September 16, 2019 at 11:01 a.m. EDT
    A series of suspected drone attacks on Saturday that targeted oil facilities in Saudi Arabia resulted in explosions and fireballs, knocking out half the kingdom’s oil output for days. Now, questions are being asked about the extent of the damage and how the attack was carried out.

    The key question, however, is who was responsible. Yemen’s Houthi rebels, at the center of a civil war against Saudi-backed forces, have claimed responsibility; on Monday, they threatened additional attacks.

    But Western and Saudi officials have cast doubt on the claim, saying the attack did not originate in Yemen. They have instead pointed the finger at a known backer of the Houthis: Iran.

    Tehran is behind nearly 100 attacks on Saudi Arabia while Rouhani and Zarif pretend to engage in diplomacy. Amid all the calls for de-escalation, Iran has now launched an unprecedented attack on the world’s energy supply. There is no evidence the attacks came from Yemen.

    — Secretary Pompeo (@SecPompeo) September 14, 2019
    “Amid all the calls for de-escalation, Iran has now launched an unprecedented attack on the world’s energy supply,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a tweet on Saturday. “There is no evidence the attacks came from Yemen.”

    The relationship between Iran and the Houthis is not simple and has long been clouded by accusations and denials and amplified by rumors and propaganda from all sides.

    Who are the Houthis?

    Based out of Yemen’s northwest, the Houthis first came to international prominence in 2015, when they helped topple the government of Yemen’s president and regional U.S. ally Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi.

    Their history, however, stretches back to the early 1990s, when a group called Shabab al-Muminin (the Believing Youth) worked to raise awareness about the Zaydi branch of Shiite Islam, which had dominated Yemen for centuries but was sidelined after a civil war in the 1960s.

    Hussein al-Houthi, one of the leaders of the Believing Youth, began staging anti-American protests after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. When Houthi was killed by government forces in 2003, his supporters renamed their group after him and continued a shift from religious protest to armed insurgency.

    From 2015 onward, the Houthis have been an active participant in the civil war that has engulfed Yemen, primarily facing off against supporters of Hadi, who is also backed by a Saudi-led international coalition.

    What are their links to Iran?

    Iranian backing of the Houthis appears to have increased over time. But experts on Iran’s network of proxies say the Houthis are among the least dependent on Tehran for financial and military support and decision-making.

    Though the Houthis began as a primarily local movement and the Zaydi branch of Shiite Islam is significantly different than the theology of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the group is part of a wide network of Tehran supported armed factions in the Middle East.

    A 2009 diplomatic cable sent by the U.S. Embassy in Yemen said that contrary to the Yemeni governments claims that the group was being armed by Iran, “most analysts report that the Houthis obtain their weapons from the Yemeni black market” and from Yemen’s military.

    In 2017, Reuters interviewed an unnamed Iranian official who said that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had held a meeting for ways to “empower” the Houthis. “At this meeting, they agreed to increase the amount of help, through training, arms and financial support,” the official said.

    Iran has issued official denials of accusations that they are arming the Houthis, but intercepted weapons shipments in the Arabian sea have found rifles, rocket launchers, anti-tank guided missiles and munitions that appear to have been en route from Iran to Yemen for the insurgency.

    Have the Houthis targeted Saudi Arabia before?

    Yes, they have. Since the start of the conflict within Yemen, the Houthis have sought to punish Saudi Arabia for its prominent role by launching attacks on Saudi soil. Last year, Saudi officials said they had intercepted over 100 ballistic missiles fired from Houthi territory.

    Armed drones attacked oil-pumping stations west of Riyadh in May and caused serious damage, while an attack on Abha airport in the south wounded 26 people in June.

    But Saturday’s attack struck right at the center of Saudi Arabia’s oil production facilities, making it a significantly more sophisticated operation than what the Houthis have been known for in the past. The blasts took place in the districts of Khurais and Abqaiq, more than than 500 miles from the Houthi-controlled zones in Yemen, using precision strikes to cause maximum damage.

    The attack may have used both drones and missiles. Fabian Hinz, a research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Monterey, argued that photos of the remnants of a missile in Saudi Arabia shows a weapon both too sophisticated to be produced domestically by the Houthis and never seen in Iran.

    “Is Iran secretly designing, testing and producing missile systems for exclusive use by its proxies?” Hinz asked in a blog post for Arms Control Wonk.

    What if the Houthis didn’t do it?

    The advanced nature of the attack has led to assertions is did not originate in Yemen but was carried out by Iranian proxies in Iraq or even Iran itself.

    It is not clear why the Houthis would claim the strike if so. It may be part of a regional strategy by Iran and its allies that would attempt to sow confusion, though many analysts have argued in the past that the Houthis, driven by local concerns, act independently of Iran when they wish to.

    Remember when Iran shot down a drone, saying knowingly that it was in their “airspace” when, in fact, it was nowhere close. They stuck strongly to that story knowing that it was a very big lie. Now they say that they had nothing to do with the attack on Saudi Arabia. We’ll see?

    — Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) September 16, 2019

    “Now they say that they had nothing to do with the attack on Saudi Arabia,” President Trump tweeted of Iran on Monday morning, before adding a tentative question. “We’ll see?”
    There is more stupidity than hydrogen in the universe, and it has a longer shelf life.”

    ― Frank Zappa

  8. #8783

    Re: World News Random, Random

    Dion Nissenbaum

    US tells Saudi Arabia that devastating weekend missile and drone attack was launched FROM Iran, not Iraq or Yemen. Riyadh has yet to reach that conclusion. American assessment comes as Trump suggests he could strike Tehran in response: w/ @summer_said

    Saudi officials say they have NOT reached the same conclusion that Iran launched the attack and indicate that the information shared by the US is not definitive.

    Saudi government issues statement saying it plans to ask UN experts to investigate the weekend attacks and won't decide on a response until that probe is complete. That's likely to slow down any rush towards a military strike by US.
    There is more stupidity than hydrogen in the universe, and it has a longer shelf life.”

    ― Frank Zappa

  9. #8784

    Re: World News Random, Random

    Amy Mackinnon��

    Meanwhile in Russia... There was an explosion at a research center which stores one of the world's largest collections of viruses including small pox & ebola. All glass in the building was shattered per RFE/RL, but Russian gov't says no biohazards released
    There is more stupidity than hydrogen in the universe, and it has a longer shelf life.”

    ― Frank Zappa

  10. #8785

    Re: World News Random, Random

    Quote Originally Posted by Ti-Amie View Post
    Amy Mackinnon��

    Meanwhile in Russia... There was an explosion at a research center which stores one of the world's largest collections of viruses including small pox & ebola. All glass in the building was shattered per RFE/RL, but Russian gov't says no biohazards released
    How unsettling.
    Meet again we do, old foe...

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